MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: (a) Followup on Vietnam Speech
        (b) Tricia Nixon

1. A mailing went out this morning to 3,500 editors and radio/TV commentators and other opinion-makers, as well as political leaders. The mailing included your text, background fact sheet, the Gallup Poll, and the New York Times story pointing out growing European support for your policies.

2. Since my earlier memo, I have heard highly favorable comment on your speech from Jimmy Stahlman, Everett Collier, Bill Hearst (he will be writing a Sunday column on this also and will see you at dinner tonight), Dick Wilson, and Jim Copley.

3. Attached are some early editorial column reactions.

4. Tricia was a smash hit in her TODAY show interview. With the additional film this unit shot yesterday in the Lincoln Study and your own side office, they expect to make this an hour's program instead of half an hour, perhaps spread over two days. The entire unit, from Barbara Walters down, was thrilled to have the opportunity to meet and talk with you.

Herbert G. Klein

Attachment
Right path on Vietnam

PRESIDENT NIXON, in his speech on Vietnam last night, resisted heavy pressure and once again made the right decision by rejecting “defeat” — a precipitate withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam.

He has decided that we must carry on, at the cost of more casualties, to give the South Vietnamese a fighting chance of staving off a Communist takeover. With the North Vietnamese showing no sign of willingness to end the war on acceptable terms, Mr. Nixon had no honorable alternative.

His opponents, in Hanoi and in the peace movement in this country, will call his decision stubborn and worse. History, in its own time, will say who was right.

The President is convinced that the pull-out-now chorus is a “vocal minority.” He appealed to the “great silent majority” of Americans to support him, and he deserves such support because his arguments make sense.

He reasoned that an immediate withdrawal would be “a disaster” because the Communists would “repeateat the massacres” of the past. A “collapse of confidence” in America would follow, promoting Communist “recklessness” and new violence in the Middle East, Berlin, and Latin America.

“Ultimately,” the President pointed out, “this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace but more war.”

By disclosing all the secret probes, contacts, and offers he had tried, Mr. Nixon made a strong case that North Vietnam is not interested in a negotiated peace, but a U.S.-Saigon surrender.

From the speech we learn that Mr. Nixon means to withdraw U.S. ground combat troops gradually and to keep air, artillery, and supply forces in Vietnam for some time to back up our allies.

There will be casualties among these units, and Hanoi can increase our cost in men whenever it is willing to pay the price. But it, too, must weigh the risks: the President now publicly warned that he will take “strong and effective measures” if increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces.

In sum, Mr. Nixon has determined that the fast, easy way out of Vietnam would be the most costly in the long run, that the “right way” is to fight on until the South Vietnamese can defend themselves.

“As President,” he reminded the country, “I held the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal (of a just and lasting peace) and then for leading our nation along it.”

Constitutionally, he is more correct than the demonstrators in the street who dispute him. We believe he had no attractive paths and took the only right one.
Mr. Nixon's Gamble

President Nixon laid it squarely on the line in his address to the nation last night.

He said that "no progress whatever" has been made in Paris. Hanoi has rebuffed all efforts to get meaningful peace negotiations under way. There has been a decline in the rate of enemy infiltration, which the President hopes will continue. He warned, however, that if the enemy increases its activity on a scale which would jeopardize our forces in Vietnam "I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation."

The President spoke of a reduction in the bombing which he has ordered into effect, and he said that more than 60,000 American troops will have been withdrawn from Vietnam by December 15. As the South Vietnamese gain in strength, "the rate of American withdrawal can become greater." Mr. Nixon flatly refused, however, to disclose his timetable for further withdrawals, contending, quite correctly, that this would "remove any incentive" for the Communists to negotiate.

What, then, is the Nixon formula for ending the war, or at least for ending American combat participation? It seems to boil down to two principal approaches.

The first is to push ahead with what is called the Vietnamization of the war—preparing the South Vietnam armed forces to assume an ever-increasing burden of the fight as the American role gradually tapers off. Second, and this is the real gamble, the President proposes to see this thing through in spite of the opposition on the home front.

He recalled that he made a campaign pledge to end the war in such a way that we could win the peace, and he said he has a plan of action to enable him to keep that pledge. He went on to say, however, that the more support he has from the American people, the sooner his pledge can be redeemed. And "the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate in Paris." Or, he might have added, in any other place.

Having laid this foundation, the President then made a dramatic appeal for the support of what he called "the great silent majority of my fellow Americans"—that majority which wants to see this war ended, but not under conditions which would mock all of our sacrifices and suffering.

Does this great silent majority exist? We think so, and fervently hope so. If it does not, if the shrill and angry voices of the anti-war demonstrators really speak for America, then the President probably will lose his gamble and a tragic war will be hurried to a catastrophic conclusion.
President Faces the Complex Problems of His Nation

(Continued from page 4)

The President is faced with the enormous task of managing the government and the nation’s economy. This requires constant attention to the needs of the American people. The President is responsible for ensuring that the country’s resources are used wisely and that the nation’s interests are served.

The budget is a crucial part of the President’s role. It is the President’s responsibility to ensure that the budget is balanced and that the government operates within its means. The President must also work with Congress to enact legislation that is in the best interests of the country.

The President is also responsible for foreign policy. This includes negotiating treaties with other nations, representing the country’s interests in international organizations, and ensuring the nation’s security.

In conclusion, the President’s role is both complex and challenging. It requires a deep understanding of the issues facing the country and a commitment to serving the best interests of the American people.
Burden of Fighting Shifts to Saigon

President Nixon has found a way to solve the Vietnam problem so far as it involves the United States. He asks the South Vietnamese government to assume the full responsibility for fighting the war. This means that the build-up of a large army will have been virtually completed in the next few months and that American forces will be able to withdraw in large part some time in 1970.

But Nixon, while indicating the process of America's pull-out of its combat forces, is not abandoning South Vietnam. American military experts and technicians will be in hand, and there will be a continuous flow of munitions and supplies to the South Vietnamese. This is the strategy which now is practiced by the Soviets and the Red Chinese at a high annual cost but without casualties.

Nixon cannot specify what he will do in every contingency. It is clear that if major attacks occur or there are threats of a mobilization of larger forces against South Vietnam, the United States will be in a position to reconsider and determine what steps can be taken at once to help the South Vietnamese.

Nixon has in mind the Vietnamization of the war. He has been seeking this all along, but he has not been able to demonstrate the meaning of that term as he can today. The Saigon government is well aware of Nixon's plans to withdraw American forces.

In a nutshell, therefore, the South Vietnamese will be fighting their own war, and the United States will be helping them — not with manpower but with money and supplies. This should satisfy those elements of American public opinion which have been ignoring the importance of the Vietnam settlement to the future of Asia and have been concentrating solely on getting American soldiers back home.

But the prospect of a bigger war has been worrying the countries of Southeast Asia for some time. Nixon has made it clear from time to time that the United States should always be in a position to fulfill its pledges as proclaimed in the Southeast Asia collective defense treaty—namely, to help preserve the right of the peoples of each country to determine their own form of government and to be free from acts of aggression. Naturally, he would ask Congress to authorize any use of military force.

This is, therefore, really not a new turn of policy but a carrying out of the promise made by President Nixon to place the main burden of the war on the shoulders of the South Vietnamese. They have been fully aware that this move was coming, and they have asked for various kinds of military advisers to help them in training and arming sufficient forces for major combat operations as well as for countering guerrilla warfare.

Nixon's speech should satisfy domestic public opinion because it means accomplishing the purpose of almost completely withdrawing troops, while at the same time South Vietnam will not be helpless or too weak to resist its adversaries.

In reviewing what has occurred since the United States announced a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, Nixon has stressed again that America has done everything possible to encourage a constructive agreement at the Paris conference. But since Hanoi has refused to make any reciprocal concessions, the United States, while leaving the matter mainly to South Vietnam, could at any time announce a readiness to be of help if North Vietnam launched a large-scale attempt to take over South Vietnam. The latter is not anticipated, however, as American troops will not withdraw completely until the South Vietnamese are strong enough to defend themselves. This means that the current low level of enemy action will have to continue for a long period before all American forces are pulled out.

The new American program has been carefully studied for many weeks, and is the result of any impulsive decision. The President recognizes that American public opinion has always favored the return of American troops as soon as South Vietnam was prepared to assume full responsibility. What has happened is that the Vietnamization of the war has come to the point of fulfillment.

While many things can develop in the next few months, the outlook is for a steady build-up of South Vietnamese military strength as American troops gradually move back home.
Nixon on Vietnam

President Nixon last night, after revealing particular and in some instances private efforts to move the Paris negotiations toward a settlement in Vietnam, addressed himself directly to the problem of how to "end the war" without negotiation. His solution is the course he has been pursuing: a decrease in the level of the fighting, with a lessening of American combat participation and a building up of South Vietnamese capabilities to take care of that country's own security.

He spoke of military security. He did not venture into the more complicated and much more difficult problems of other kinds of security without which military security could not function, such as economic stability and a political base much broader in public South Vietnamese acceptance than the present government in Saigon enjoys. This was the largest gap, and it is a very large one, in his discussion of "Vietnamization" of the war.

[If thus he spoke too largely of a new "plan" and a new "initiative" for peace, still he is quite justified in hoping that he has changed the American direction substantially, and in all probability irreversibly, in Vietnam, by actually putting in force a program of withdrawal of American troops, and by reducing the level of combat. Though last night he did not, as it had been anticipated that he might, announce new withdrawals, and though he properly declined to announce a schedule of future withdrawals which could only have helped the enemy in his military and diplomatic planning, he adhered to that policy, with what seemed to be but a token threat that under certain circumstances he might indeed reverse it.

In his mention of the future, the President referred first to the past, accurately attributing the beginnings of the Vietnamese dilemma to the policies of his predecessors. But he did not project into the future a view of Southeast Asia much different from theirs. He might well have made more of, and leaned more upon, his own thorough, broad and far-sighted conception of the role of the United States in Southeast Asia, and in the world, as expressed last summer on Guam at the beginning of his journey around the globe.
President Nixon last night offered the United States the leadership which Americans elected him to provide. There can be no question but that the nation will respond with the strength and support Mr. Nixon clearly needs and merits.

The Nixon Doctrine, first proclaimed in a statement issued by the President in Guam and now applied for the first time in our history, is simply this: We will support freedom and self-determination — but those who would be free must be prepared to fight for it.

In Vietnam, the progress already made as a result of accelerated training of native troops is encouraging. For the first time since we began escalation of our direct military involvement, we are reducing the number of American troops in the battle zone. Under Mr. Nixon’s plan, the process will continue until he has undone the situation which he inherited.

It was a speech completely free of any promise of instant solution. It was an uncomfortable speech, thorny with facts. It was definitely not a speech for Camelot: in the difficult months ahead, we were told, we will have to achieve our goal despite inclement conditions which we cannot control by fiat or fantasy. But what the speech may have lacked in charisma, it made up for in candor: the President spoke to us as though we were responsible adults. He will find his fellow citizens to be both — responsible and adult.

Striped of decorative and even slippery language, the choices facing us were, after all, pitifully few. We could have decided to attack North Vietnam and “end all the nonsense.” We could have decided to lose — to get out and forget our promises and close our eyes to the massacres that would have followed. We could have elected to continue as we have been doing since the first 16,000 American soldiers were committed in the beginning of this decade. We did not in conscience want the first. We could not stomach the second. We might have had difficulty surviving the third.

Therefore, only one other course remained: to do what we should have done from the beginning, to help the Vietnamese take over their own fight for their own right to self-determination.

This is the direction that has been chosen. It is the right direction.

Never has an American President needed the nation’s support more. Never has one deserved it more.