

**An Analysis of the Factors
Involved in Moving to an
All-Volunteer Armed Force**

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"The compulsory draft is far more typical of totalitarian nations than of democratic nations. The theory behind it leads directly to totalitarianism. It is absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty which have always been considered a part of American democracy."

Senator Robert A. Taft, 1940

Despite the fact that the draft was recently extended for another four years, it continues to be a highly controversial issue that is of direct, immediate importance to literally tens of millions of Americans. If the Vietnam war continues and draft calls escalate, it promises to become a topic of increasing importance to more and more people.

The drafting of the youth of our country constitutes two years of involuntary servitude to the State. It is inimicable to the basic principles of freedom that are the moral foundations of our Republic. In the past, it has been tolerated reluctantly by many people only because it has been thought to be absolutely necessary to preserve and protect the national security of the United States. Many reasons have been given why we must maintain the draft, but the two fundamental ones concern (1) the economic cost of abandoning it and (2) the effect such a move might have on our military effectiveness.

In his opening remarks on the draft hearings in 1966, the influential chairman of the Armed Services Committee, L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, stated: "...despite the fact that the philosophy of conscription is inimicable to our basic concept of individual freedom, we as a nation recognize that the alternatives can only result in jeopardizing our national security....Perhaps it would be possible to maintain a completely voluntary professional military force of three million men by providing massive increases in their compensations. However, these costs would be astronomical..."

To most men the moral case against the draft is clear and beyond question. The existence of a draft raises difficult questions. Why should some men be forced to serve, when others are exempt? Why should some men be forced to sacrifice two of the most important years of their lives, to risk possible maiming and death, so that the great majority of the people may pursue their own interests, safe and secure?

In principle, there is a clear way out of this dilemma; no one has any duty to serve the State, no one should be forced by others to make sacrifices or risk bodily harm for their benefit. One of the great principles of the United States government is the idea that the government serves the people (all the people), not that the people serve the government. The key to effectuating this principle in the military sphere lies in the ultimate establishment of a modern, highly-trained armed force of competent professionals, staffed completely by volunteers.

Virtually all men would agree that such a course is the right one, but many have sincere doubts that it is a practical one. These fears are no longer justified. Recent studies by reliable experts now show clearly that it is within our power to eliminate this last vestige of involuntary servitude without weakening our national defenses, without incurring "astronomical" costs. To the contrary, it is likely that our national defenses would be strengthened, and that the additional cost would be relatively small.

The Effect on National Security

Our current reliance on the draft has resulted in an armed force that includes a significant number of men, particularly in the enlisted ranks, who don't want to be there, who grudgingly learn enough to "get by," and who leave as soon as possible. The changing nature of military strategy and technology is making large masses of men more obsolete; more and more we need highly specialized men, with extensive training and experience, to operate our sophisticated weapons systems. By relying on the draft, we have developed an armed force which is characterized by a high number of trainees and inexperienced men who must constantly be replaced.

Fully 93 percent of draftees leave the military as soon as possible, and their expensive training is largely wasted. In the Army, approximately 70 percent of the enlisted men have less than

two years experience. According to Brig. General Lynn Smith, "As soon as we are able to operate as a unit, the trained men leave and we have to start all over again."

This situation would not exist with an all-volunteer armed force. According to the Department of Defense, people who enlist are five times as likely to reenlist as draftees. An armed force of volunteers would have a higher percentage of skilled, motivated men, far fewer men would constantly be in training, and fewer of our most experienced personnel would be tied down as training instructors.

Individual fighting units would not be subject to constant turnover within their ranks. Men who are making the military a career would be working together for long periods of time, and would develop into a close-knit, efficient team. Highly trained specialists would be far more likely to stay in the military and utilize their skills in the defense of the country. A highly trained, highly motivated team of professionals, skilled in the technical aspects of modern war should be -- man for man -- a far more effective fighting force. A good recent example of such a force is Israel; pitted against numerically greater forces who were heavily armed with the latest weapons, they demonstrated clearly the importance of individual ability and motivation in their quick rout of the Arabs.

The Economics of An All-Volunteer Armed Force

The basic reason why the draft is necessary today is simply that we have not been willing to pay even reasonably fair wages to our men in the military. During his first tour of duty in the military, an enlisted man earns only the equivalent of \$2,400 a year, including all benefits. His base pay starts at about \$91 a month. When we pay slave wages, we should not be surprised that we must resort to the practice of involuntary servitude.

Policemen protect us from domestic criminals, servicemen protect us from foreign criminals. If we suddenly lowered the starting pay of policemen, or, for that matter, CIA personnel and FBI agents, to the equivalent of \$46 a week, we would undoubtedly have to draft them also. Perhaps a more basic question than "Can we afford a volunteer armed force?" is "How can we justify the incredibly low pay offered?"

The amount of money the federal government offers young men to take on a risky, responsible job is far below the so-called poverty level, far below the hourly wage set by minimum wage legislation. We pay clerk-typists in Washington more than we pay combat soldiers in Vietnam. The entering level pay of a soldier from the United States, the richest country in the world, is below that of the Canadian and Australian recruit.

Recently, England decided that she could afford to eliminate involuntary servitude, abolished the draft and established an all-volunteer armed force. If we intend to eliminate the draft,

we must move in the direction of increasing the pay and other benefits offered to the military. But how much will it cost? Is the cost feasible; or is it so high that we would be unable to pay it, even if we were willing?

In estimating the costs of moving to an all-volunteer armed force, it will be necessary to consider many factors. A number of factors, all of which have a direct bearing on the total cost, will change -- some of them will increase costs, others will decrease costs. These factors will change simultaneously; the savings must be considered along with the added costs in order to arrive at a correct estimate of the final result. Of necessity, these estimates will not be precise, but they will be accurate enough for decision-making purposes.

The cost estimates that follow are based primarily on the methods and data incorporated in an extensive study of this issue by the Department of Defense. In addition, they are supplemented by material developed by Walter Oi, a Professor of Economics at the University of Washington. Professor Oi is a manpower expert who was a key consultant to the Department of Defense for one year during their study.

On the basis of the testimony of Mr. Morris, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, before the Committee on Armed Services, and the widely publicized interpretation of his testimony by the press, a misleading impression has been given that the additional cost of an all-volunteer armed force would be likely

to cost in the neighborhood of \$17 to \$20 billion. A careful reading of the full study conducted by the Department of Defense shows that this impression is false; the actual estimated cost is far lower.

Let us begin by estimating the cost of an all-volunteer force of 2.65 million men, a figure which approximates closely the recent average level of manpower in the armed forces. Unusual situations, like Korea, the Berlin crisis, and Vietnam will cause this figure to be higher for short periods of time. Later, we will examine how much higher the costs are likely to go under conditions such as these.

The Estimating Procedure

The number of men required for the defense of the country will be affected by the degree of the threat posed to the national security of the United States, and the level of wages that must be paid. It will be assumed that the military makes its judgment concerning the level of manpower solely on the basis of military strategy and does not consider the level of military pay. However, it is likely that military planners would be more prudent in calculating their needs if the cost of supplying them were substantially higher; this would result in a more efficient use of manpower, with a consequent reduction in the number of men required. Thus, the following cost estimates will be biased upward to some degree.

The number of men that will volunteer for the armed forces at any given level of pay is affected by many factors. These would include (1) the number of qualified men in the country, (2) the level of pay for civilian work, (3) the level of unemployment, (4) the pressure exerted by the presence of a draft law, and (5) the degree of the threat to the national security.

To begin with, all the above factors -- with the exception of the draft -- will be assumed constant. Assuming that we need an armed force of 2.65 million men, we will proceed in the following manner: (1) assuming that the level of military pay stays at the current level, we will estimate how many men we could get on a volunteer basis if the draft law were repealed, and then (2) we will estimate how much more it would cost the government to raise the number of men required under the assumption of an all-volunteer force.

Assume the Draft is Repealed

If the draft were suddenly repealed, there is little doubt that the number of men in the armed forces would drop sharply, given the existing levels of pay. The present armed force is composed of three groups: (1) True volunteers, (2) Reluctant Volunteers and (3) Draftees. True volunteers are those who find the military an attractive occupation, even at the present low pay level. Reluctant volunteers are those who elect to volunteer because they are motivated to some degree by the threat of

eventually being drafted. Draftees are those who are forced into the military.

It should be noted that even under current conditions -- with the draft -- a considerable number of men volunteer for the armed forces. Virtually all the enlisted men in the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines are volunteers. All officers in all branches are volunteers. Essentially the Army is the only branch that is required to rely on draftees to fill their enlisted ranks. During the period 1960-1965, 645,000 men annually entered the armed forces; 539,000 or 84 percent of them entered through a variety of voluntary programs. And while it is true that some were "reluctant volunteers," the majority volunteered freely.

In late 1964, the Department of Defense surveyed over 600,000 regular enlisted personnel and divided volunteers into true and reluctant volunteers on the basis of their responses. It was concluded that about 62 percent were true volunteers. A similar survey for officers indicated that about 59 percent of them were true volunteers. Thus, approximately half of our current armed force is composed of true volunteers.

The Additional Annual Cost of Staffing an All-Volunteer Force

The most obvious effect of moving to an all-volunteer force is the "loss" of draftees and reluctant volunteers. If all other factors remain constant, it will be necessary to raise military

pay levels high enough to induce enough men to join each year to meet manpower needs. However, the nature of the armed forces also changes in such a way as to reduce costs. These cost reductions are primarily associated with the size of the armed force that is necessary to provide a particular level of national security, the number of new recruits needed each year, and the number of experienced men needed as instructors.

A partially drafted army is characterized by a high degree of turnover; the higher the proportion of draftees, the higher the rate of turnover. The records of the Department of Defense show that approximately 93 percent of those men who are drafted leave after their initial tour of duty is up; on the other hand, only about two-thirds of the volunteers leave then.

Consequently, the move to an all-volunteer force would result in much greater stability. The higher reenlistment rates of volunteers would result in lower personnel turnover. Fewer men would leave the military each year, and thus fewer men would be needed to maintain any given level of manpower.

In addition, it should be noted that the same amount of military protection could be provided with fewer men in an all-volunteer force than in a partially drafted one. At any given time, the armed forces are composed of experienced men and trainees, and it is the experienced men who provide the protection. Thus, if we have an armed force of, say, 2.7 million men, and 500,000 are in training, our effective force is only 2.2 million men.

According to Brig. General Lynn Smith, over 43 percent of our Army is composed of men with less than one year's experience. With a volunteer force, fewer trainees would be required, and consequently the same level of effective manpower could be provided with fewer men.

At the same time that the number of trainees is being reduced, the number of experienced men required to conduct the training is also reduced. This will further reduce the total amount of manpower required.

A fairly conservative estimate of the additional annual cost involved in moving to an all-volunteer armed force can be obtained by estimating the number of men required annually without taking into account the savings from lower training costs. Professor Oi has estimated, on the basis of the historical record of men who volunteered at existing low pay levels, and their reenlistment rates, that the number of new recruits needed each year to maintain an all-volunteer force of 2.65 million men would be approximately 362,000. This is about two thirds the number required annually with a partially drafted force. This estimate does not take into account the likelihood that, at considerably higher levels of pay, more men will reenlist in the future than in the past; this omission will also bias the cost estimate upward.

At existing pay levels, the 362,000 volunteers required will not be forthcoming. This is particularly true for the Army, where the estimated annual requirements would be 145,000 men, and only

90,000 would be expected to volunteer. To estimate what increase in pay would be necessary to induce the required number of men to volunteer, the differences in current voluntary enlistment rates in various geographic regions of the United States was analyzed and correlated with civilian opportunities in each region as measured by civilian pay and unemployment rates. It was found that the lower the level of civilian pay and the higher the unemployment rate, the higher was the voluntary enlistment rate. On the basis of what was considered to be a significant statistical correlation, Professor Oi has estimated that a pay raise of 68 percent for enlisted men would be sufficient to attract enough volunteers. The Department of Defense, using the same technique, came up with slightly higher figures (80 percent with an unemployment rate of 5.5 percent). The pay scale used includes (1) base pay, (2) money payments for subsistence, quarters and uniforms, (3) the implicit value of subsistence and quarters if the servicemen receive no money allowance for these, and (4) the appropriate adjustment for taxes.

A 68 percent pay raise would increase an enlisted man's annual pay during his first tour of duty from \$2,400 to \$4,200 -- or to about \$81 a week. In order to avoid any imbalance in the total pay structure, it was also estimated that current career men, who already are volunteers, would have their pay raised an average of 17 percent. The pay scale varies according to the serviceman's job and the length of time he has been in the service;

these factors are incorporated in the cost calculations. With pay raises of this order of magnitude, the armed forces should be able to meet all its requirements with volunteer personnel.

According to the defense budget for 1965, the annual cost of active duty personnel was approximately \$12 billion. Making the necessary adjustments for the higher pay scales, and the higher retention rates, it is estimated that an all-volunteer force of 2.65 million men would cost about \$16 billion a year. The defense budget would have to be increased about \$4 billion a year to obtain an all-volunteer force of 2.65 million men. Today, the federal government spends about \$175 billion a year; \$4 billion would increase annual expenditures by less than 2½ percent.

In addition, there are considerable savings that could be realized in training costs. If, for example, the active duty force could be cut by only 5 percent, approximately \$800 million in annual savings would result, reducing the additional annual cost to \$3.2 billion. It should be noted that these are most likely estimates, and, as with all economic forecasts, there is some uncertainty involved.

The Department of Defense's own cost estimates of eliminating the draft are higher than those of Professor Oi, although they are based on essentially the same data. But even these estimates do not preclude the economic feasibility of an all-volunteer armed force. Reproduced below is a summary of the cost estimates the Department of Defense submitted in June, 1966.

Estimated Increase in Payroll Costs Necessary to
Obtain an All-Volunteer Force of 2.7 million
(in billions of dollars)

Unemployment Rate	5.5 percent			4.0 percent		
Quality of Estimate	low	best	high	low	best	high
Total Additional Cost	\$3.67	\$5.42	\$10.28	\$5.51	\$8.34	\$16.66

With a 5.5 percent unemployment rate, the additional annual cost ranges from \$3.67 to \$10.28 billion, but it should be noted that these extremes are unlikely. Their most likely estimate, which is most relevant, is \$5.42 billion. If the unemployment rate should possibly fall as low as 4.0 percent and stay there, their most likely estimate rises to \$8.34 billion.

The above cost estimates are for maintaining an all-volunteer force, and they do not take into account the fact that the annual cost would probably be somewhat higher during the transition years. According to Professor Oi, this factor would probably increase annual costs by about \$600 million a year until the higher reenlistment rates of the new volunteers reduced the number of new recruits required each year.

Thus, even during the more expensive transition phase, the additional cost of maintaining an all-volunteer armed force of 2.65 million men would be in the range of \$3.8 billion (Professor Oi's estimate) to \$6 billion (Department of Defense's most likely estimate). There will always be a degree of uncertainty

concerning these figures, but it is highly unlikely that the actual cost would deviate significantly from this range. The widely publicized additional costs of anywhere from \$17 to \$20 billion are totally unrealistic. For the Department of Defense to state, as Mr. Morris, the Assistant Secretary for Manpower did, that the additional costs could range from \$4 billion to \$17 billion is comparable to Mr. McNamara, when he was with the Ford Motor Company, estimating the cost of a new Ford at "somewhere between \$2,000 and \$8,500." Defense cost projections are admittedly uncertain, but they are not that uncertain.

The previous cost estimates are based on an armed force of 2.65 million men. Our current level of military manpower is close to 3.3 million men, and it may be raised in the future. Even if these conditions continue, an all-volunteer armed force is still economically feasible. For example, Professor Oi's estimate of the additional cost of maintaining an all-volunteer force of 3.0 million men is \$6.7 billion. It should be noted that the cost estimates for higher levels of manpower are subject to a greater degree of uncertainty than for lower levels. For example, the estimated additional cost of maintaining an all-volunteer force of 3.3 million men ranges from \$8 to \$10 billion a year. Thus, even in time of hostilities, such as Vietnam, the additional cost is feasible within the context of our federal budget.

Other Factors Affecting Costs

There are many other factors which affect military manpower costs, both for a partially drafted and an all-volunteer force, although they would have a relatively higher effect on an all-volunteer force. One factor which is likely to increase military manpower costs is the level of civilian pay. As the level of civilian pay in the economy rises, military pay must also increase proportionately or an increasing shortage of manpower will result. The important thing to watch is the differential between civilian and military pay. The smaller the differential, the more attractive the military is relative to civilian occupations and vice versa.

The general level of unemployment in the country also will have a significant effect on manpower recruitment. If unemployment rises, military occupations will become more attractive and relatively more men will seek to enlist. The reverse is true if unemployment falls.

On the other hand, there are a number of factors and courses of action that could lower significantly the annual cost of military manpower. At this stage, it is difficult to form any precise estimates of the effect they will have, but we can be reasonably sure that they will operate in the direction of reducing costs. Hopefully, some extensive research will be conducted in these areas in the near future.

One of the most important ways to reduce military manpower costs is to increase the number of qualified people; the greater

the number of people qualified for military service, the lower military pay has to be to attract any given number of them. The combination of a natural increase in population coupled with a more reasonable, realistic manpower policy on the part of the armed forces could increase the number of qualified people dramatically.

According to the Bureau of the Census, there were approximately 12.5 million men aged 18 to 25 in the United States in 1965. This figure is expected to increase to 15.1 million in 1970, and further to 17.2 million in 1975. An increase of about 50 percent in the number of men in this age bracket will make it relatively less costly to obtain a given number of men for military service.

And while the increase in population gradually ameliorates the recruitment problem, there are steps that can be taken today that could expand the qualified number of people significantly. One of the most important things that could be done is to develop a more sophisticated mental and physical classification system for potential military recruits. Since the Korean conflict, about half of the men in the appropriate age bracket have been disqualified for military service for various mental, physical and moral reasons. In 1964, fully 57.0 percent of them were disqualified, although the recent pressures of the Vietnam war have managed to drop this sharply to about 40 percent. But even so, it is hard to believe that four out of ten young men in the United States are "unfit" for all kinds of military service.

The key to eliminating this situation lies in the creation of a multiple-level physical and mental classification system. There is no reason why a football player with a trick knee cannot be utilized in one of the thousands of military jobs where it would be of no consequence. For example, potential enlistees could be classified in one of, say, ten levels of physical condition and mental ability. Then each military job could be analyzed in regard to the degree of physical fitness and mental ability required for that particular job, and the appropriate assignment could be made. In one of the healthiest societies in the world, where the illiteracy rate is only 0.6 percent, it is likely that such a policy would produce increases of anywhere from 50 to 75 percent in the number of qualified men.

Along this same line, serious consideration should be given to encouraging women to enlist in the armed forces, and every effort should be devoted to determining which jobs they could handle competently. Women were used very successfully in World War II by the United States; Israel proved even more dramatically a few weeks ago the important role women can play in the defense of their country. The result of such a policy would be to increase still further the number of qualified people.

As the number of people qualified for military service increased, steps could also be taken to increase the percentage of this number that will enlist voluntarily in the armed forces at any given level of military pay. Much more attention should be given to the recruitment techniques used by the armed forces.

Massive promotion campaigns, designed to acquaint qualified people with the occupational and educational opportunities available in the armed forces, would have the effect of increasing the number of volunteers. If people are uncertain about what they may be getting into, they will be reluctant to join. In developing this policy, the added costs of recruitment should be weighed against the potential savings in manpower costs that would result. One of the sad consequences of the existence of the current draft law is that it tends to create a dependence on its use, for the military realizes that any needs that they do not fulfill by current recruiting techniques will be swiftly met by General Hershey's conscription machine.

Further, the number of men actually required by the armed forces to carry out their obligations could probably be reduced by a more efficient utilization of manpower within the military. The neglect of this area is shameful. During the Congressional hearings in May, 1967, Mr. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, ruefully admitted, "The manpower field, no one can deny, is as important, if not more important than any other aspect of our military strength. But I recently found in checking expenditures made for research and development that for every dollar spent on manpower research, we are spending \$300,000 on weapons or weapons-related research." When the price paid for manpower is fixed, there is little incentive for the military to devote much effort to better utilization of its men. Increases

of efficiency of only five or six percent could result in savings of upward of \$1 billion a year.

In today's world, there is increasing utilization of advanced technology and equipment in the armed forces. As this trend continues, there will be an increasing substitution of advanced weapons systems for brute manpower. The armed force of the future promises to be more and more characterized by the experienced, skilled technician, and less and less by the tough, courageous foot soldier. As these developments progress, there will be a gradual reduction in the number of men required for any given level of military protection.

Thus, there are many important courses of action that can be taken today to substantially reduce the cost of military manpower. Perhaps one of the most ironic consequences of the existence of the draft is that it tends to mute any significant overtures along this line, and, instead tends to perpetuate and compound the very situation that forms much of the rationale for its use.

The Remaining Objections to an All-Volunteer Armed Force

(1) We Can't Be Absolutely Sure It Will Work

Many people seem to fear that our military defenses would be subject to a great deal of uncertainty if we suddenly repealed the draft and relied on volunteers. They are afraid that the country might be subject to great danger if enough men did not volunteer to protect it.

The answer here is that any movement toward an all-volunteer force would be gradual. One possible course is to repeal the draft in principle and immediately begin to institute pay raises and other reforms. Then, as the number of men volunteering increased, draft calls would be correspondingly reduced. At some time in the future -- perhaps two or three years -- the number of men volunteering would be more than sufficient to meet our military needs. At that point, the draft would fade into the history books.

At no time during this transition phase would the national security of the United States be in any greater danger than would exist under a partially drafted force. In fact, because the volunteers would most likely make far more effective fighting men, we would experience an actual increase in military protection as the percentage of volunteers gradually increased.

Moreover, if politically necessary, standby draft provisions, which could only be used in times of extreme emergency, could be developed. However, not only would this be morally wrong, it is also likely to be (as we shall see shortly) unnecessary and ineffective. The rational alternative to emergency standby draft provisions is a powerful, truly ready, active reserve force of experienced, skilled men, supplemented by a justifiable confidence in the willingness of Americans to rise to the defense of their country in time of extreme danger regardless of pay or benefits.

(2) A Volunteer Force Lacks Flexibility

A number of influential people have asserted that an all-volunteer force would permit no flexibility in time of crisis. The President's National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, headed by Burke Marshall, stated in February, 1967, "The sudden need for greater numbers of men would find the nation without the machinery to meet it. To a Commission deliberating grave issues of life and death in an atmosphere created by just such a sudden need, this is of overriding significance." This particular assertion has gained fairly widespread credibility, and is often used as the only reason for retaining the draft. For this reason, it is very important to examine it closely to determine if there is any thread of justification in it.

With all respect to the President's Commission, the opposite of what they conclude is true. Flexibility, in the context of military defense, refers to the speed with which a country can mobilize its manpower and resources to meet a sudden, serious threat to its national security. In such a situation, a draft is useless, and reliance on it would place us in danger.

The process of conscripting a man for military service takes, at the very least, weeks, and, at a time when hundreds of thousands are required, it is likely to take months. Moreover, a teenage draftee, suddenly wrenched from his home, is going to require several months of intensive training to make even a passable soldier. Past experiments with accelerated training

in the armed forces have proven that military training cannot be successfully crammed into a short period of time. When tried, the youths collapsed under the mental and physical strain.

And even if it were somehow possible to conscript and train hundreds of thousands of young men in, say, three to four months, the final result would be a sudden influx of inexperienced, unskilled men who would be difficult to assimilate effectively into our fighting forces. Their contribution to our military security would be doubtful -- and many months too late.

What is required in time of extreme, sudden emergency is a large active ready reserve force, composed of experienced, skilled men who can be mobilized and assimilated quickly and effectively into the career armed force. A brilliant recent example of the efficaciousness of this procedure was the mobilization of 10 percent of the entire population of Israel in just 48 hours. If something comparable could be effectuated in the United States, it would mean the mounting of an incredible force of 20 million men in two days.

Such a system is the only really effective way to increase military manpower quickly. The establishment of an all-volunteer reserve force, that was really well-trained, that was really ready, would accomplish this. According to the Department of Defense, such a reserve force could be maintained by the additional expenditure of \$1 billion a year. This, of course, would become an integral part of any move toward an all-volunteer career armed force and would increase the cost accordingly.

If the emergency developed more gradually -- giving us time to increase our military strength -- more extensive recruiting efforts (including an explanation of the impending danger) and increased pay could be used to gradually increase both our career force and our ready reserve force.

Thus, an all-volunteer armed force, supplemented by an all-volunteer ready reserve, is not only adequate in terms of flexibility, it is necessary. The conclusions of the President's Commission, if widely accepted in the highest levels of our government, could lull us into the potentially dangerous attitude of relying on draftees to meet sudden threats to our national security. The only "flexibility" to be gained by having conscription is the ability of the federal government to force men into military service when they cannot persuade them with valid reasons.

(3) There is More Danger of a Military "Take-over"

A few people have raised the specter of a possible military take-over of the United States if we establish a professional armed force. Although the historical record and the current situation in the United States gives little, if any, justification for such a fear, it should be examined closely. To begin with, any potential military take-over would almost certainly initiate in the top ranks of the officer corps of the armed forces. And today's officer corps is already composed solely of volunteer, professional military men. A move to an all-volunteer force would only affect the lower ranks of

enlisted men, particularly in the Army. It seems quite unlikely that the replacement of teenage conscripts with teenage volunteers, who have no control over military policy, would seriously enhance the chances of a military take-over in the United States. If anyone is concerned about this, the proper course would be an examination of the relationship between the military and civilian authority at the highest levels.

(4) It is Not "Right" to be Defended by "Mercenaries"

A mercenary is a man who fights for anyone -- regardless of nationality or ideology or moral conviction -- for money. To maintain that giving a man a fair wage to perform a difficult, risky job makes him a so-called mercenary is to smirch the 2.2 million men who currently compose the volunteer, professional ranks of our armed forces. It is scarcely possible that Americans would be indifferent to whom they fought for. The objection to mercenaries is invalid on its face, and is probably injected into the debate to obscure the real issues.

(5) We Would be Defended by an All-Negro Armed Force

Any reluctance to be defended by Negroes per se is overt racism. Moreover, an all Negro armed force is physically impossible. Even in the highly unlikely event that all qualified Negroes volunteered, the majority of the armed forces would still be white. On the other hand, it is possible, even likely, that a relatively higher percentage of Negroes would enlist voluntarily, but they would only do so if they found it to their advantage.

As Professor Milton Friedman put it, "Clearly, it is a good thing, not a bad thing, to offer better alternatives to the currently disadvantaged.....Our government should discriminate neither in the civil nor in the military services."

(6) It Would be Impossible to Get the Right Men for the Right Jobs

Obtaining the appropriate men for particular jobs is a technical manpower problem that has already been solved admirably with volunteers by our Navy, our Air Force, our Marines, and our officer corps in all branches of the armed forces. For jobs that are relatively difficult to fill, appropriate adjustment in pay and other incentives would be made as they are being made today, for example, with doctors.

(7) In Time of Great Danger Men Have to be Forced to Fight

If there ever was a serious threat to the national security of the United States, men would be strongly motivated to fight to defend their lives, their families, and their property. Judging from our experience in prior times of great stress, it is likely that there would be far more volunteers than could be incorporated usefully into an effective fighting force.

Summary

Over an extended period, the additional annual cost of an all-volunteer armed force, including an all-volunteer active ready reserve, would most likely average about \$5 billion a year; even the most likely estimate of the Department of Defense places it

only slightly higher at \$7 billion a year. Therefore, because it is moral and fair, because it increases our national security, and because it is economically feasible, we should establish a volunteer armed force that will offer the young people of our country the opportunity to participate in her defense with dignity, with honor, and as free men.

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