

Briefing Paper
HAK Mideast
Trip
Nov. 5-10, 1973

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SUBJECT: Middle East Negotiations

I. Purposes and Assumptions

-- U.S. interests require an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

-- The political-military situation in the area resulting from the October 6-22, 1973 war, the new evolving U.S.-Soviet relationship, and the provision for Arab-Israel negotiations in Security Council Resolution 338 create favorable new conditions for renewed efforts toward a settlement.

-- It is important to establish and maintain momentum toward a settlement quickly in the aftermath of the recent war.

-- We need to have an idea of where we want to come out in order to know best how to get there.

II. Terms of an Arab-Israeli Settlement

While the United States has no interest at the outset of Arab-Israel peace negotiations in defining to others what we would consider reasonable final terms of an overall settlement, it will be useful to have some general principles in mind to serve as a standard against which to measure our strategy and tactic as negotiations proceed. In their simplest form, these principles include:

-- Minimal territorial changes from the pre-June 5, 1967, borders.

-- Maximum practical security arrangements for Israel, including the presence of Israeli forces in Arab sovereign territory during a transitional period in areas of particular importance to Israeli security; demilitarization of key areas; use of peacekeeping forces.

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-- Strong Arab commitments as part of a formal peace agreement, including recognition of Israel, control over irregular forces operating from Arab territory, end of economic boycott.

-- An Arab civic, religious and economic presence within a unified and open city of Jerusalem.

-- An equitable settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem, involving limited and controlled repatriation of some to Israel and generous compensation for resettlement and rehabilitation of the others.

-- A political outlet for Palestinian political expression, to be worked out within a Jordanian-Palestinian framework and to include most of the West Bank and Gaza.

-- Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, Strait of Tiran and Bab al-Mandeb.

-- Strong international guarantees of the final settlement, including the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the U.S., and a specific US-Israeli agreement.

Applying these principles to the issues dividing Israel and each of the Arab parties suggests the following general peace settlement terms:

Egypt-Israel (See Tab A for more detail)

-- Egyptian sovereignty over all of the Sinai Peninsula, up to the 1967 border excluding Gaza, would be acknowledged by Israel. Egyptian civilian authority would be reestablished at an early date.

-- As part of a comprehensive plan for demilitarization of the Sinai, the area could be divided into three major security zones. The first might range from the Suez Canal up to the western edge of the Mitla and Gidi Passes, then on north to the Mediterranean coast. Within this zone an Egyptian military presence would be allowed, subject to restrictions on type and number of weapons. A second zone, ranging from the passes on

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the western edge to a line south of al-Arish down to Sharm al-Shaykh, would initially contain some Israeli garrisons, but progressively would be demilitarized and supervised by UN peacekeeping forces, which might include both Egyptian and Israeli contingents and/or liaison personnel. The third zone, between a line running from just east of al-Arish to Sharm al-Shaykh on the zone's western edge to the international border on the east, would contain Israeli military forces for a transitional period (up to a year) specified in the final peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. At the conclusion of the transitional period, the area would be demilitarized, with special arrangements for Sharm al-Shaykh (see below). The removal of Israeli forces from zones two and three would be conditional upon Egyptian compliance with its obligations under the terms of the settlement, to be verified by the UN Security Council.

-- At Sharm al-Shaykh, an international force, including Israeli and Egyptian contingents and/or liaison personnel will guarantee free transit through the Strait of Tiran. This could be made part of a broader shipping convention that would cover the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandeb. (See Tab B.)

-- Aerial reconnaissance over the entire Sinai will be permitted to Israel, Egypt and the international peacekeeping force.

-- Egypt will reopen the Suez Canal to international shipping, including Israeli ships without discrimination, at the earliest possible date.

-- Egypt and Israel will recognize one another and, upon completion of negotiations, will sign a formal peace treaty.

-- The terms of settlement would be guaranteed by the UN Security Council, by a joint US-USSR declaration, and by a unilateral US statement, endorsed by a Congressional resolution.

Syria-Israel

-- Syrian sovereignty and civilian authority would be restored to most of the area occupied by Israel since

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June 5, 1967. This area would be demilitarized, with UN observers and peacekeeping forces (to include Syrian and Israeli contingents and/or liaison personnel), established in the area. Israel, Syria and the peacekeeping force would be allowed to perform aerial reconnaissance over the demilitarized area.

-- Within an agreed-upon zone to the east of the pre-June 5, 1967, border, including some of the high ground of the Golan Heights, Israel would be permitted to maintain its military and civilian positions, and the border would be adjusted accordingly, so that this area would become sovereign Israeli territory.

-- Syria and Israel would recognize each other and sign a formal peace agreement ending the state of war between them.

Jordan-Israel (See Tab C for more details)

-- Israel would return most of the West Bank and cede Gaza to Jordan, but would retain several military garrisons in both and retain control over portions of the Jordan Valley over an agreed period. Border adjustments would be made in the Latrun, Qalqiliya and Jerusalem areas. The extent and duration of this Israeli presence in Gaza and the West Bank would be negotiated.

-- The areas of the West Bank and Gaza returned to Jordan would be demilitarized, with the exception of Israeli forces during a transitional period and lightly armed Jordanian police forces. Israelis would be allowed to man posts at the Jordan River to check on the movement of military equipment.

-- The Jordanian Government would assume responsibility for preventing acts of violence against Israel carried out from its territory.

-- Israel should not impede the free movement of goods and people between Gaza and the West Bank across Israeli territory in time of peace.

-- Jerusalem would remain a united city. (See Tab D.) Within a unified Jerusalem, several administrative layers would be created, one of which would provide for Arab control over local matters in the Arab sector. For these purposes, the Arab sector of the city would be defined as the Christian and Muslim quarters of the walled city as well as parts of the surrounding Arab-inhabited areas. The Arab sector of Jerusalem would contain the seat of government for the province of Jordan consisting of the West Bank and Gaza. A special convention would be devised for protection of the holy places.

-- Israeli civilian settlements near Hebron and in the Jordan Valley would be the subject of special agreement. One possibility would be for them to remain in place provided that an equivalent number of Palestinian refugees were allowed to resettle in Israel.

-- Jordan will recognize and sign a formal peace treaty with Israel.

The Palestinians (See Tab E)

-- Israel would accept the principle of giving Palestinian refugees a choice between repatriation to Israel or resettlement elsewhere. In practice, the number actually repatriated would be limited by the establishment of annual quotas. Repatriation to Israel of a limited number of Palestinians could be in return for Jordanian acceptance of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank. Refugees returning to Israel would be subject to Israeli security checks before being accepted.

-- Israel, along with the international community, would provide generous compensation for those refugees who do not resettle in Israel. In addition, a special international development fund could be established under the administration of the Jordanian Government to be used for rehabilitation of refugees and development of the West Bank and Gaza.

-- The Government of Jordan, in consultation with Palestinian leaders, will develop a plan for regional autonomy and political expression for the Palestinians residing in the area of the West Bank

and Gaza. The relationship between this Palestinian province and the Jordanian Government in Amman will be the subject of a referendum. The Palestinian province will be demilitarized and will maintain open borders with Israel in time of peace.

III. POSITIONS PARTIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON (A) SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND (B) NEGOTIATING MODALITIES

1. Egypt

(a) Substantive Issues

Sadat has been left in an uncertain situation by the ceasefire. His military position is precarious--particularly as reflected by the predicament of the Egyptian III Corps--but he has nevertheless made some broad political gains as a result of the war. The Arabs now have greater confidence that they can withstand and eventually even emerge victorious in further rounds of warfare with Israel, yet foremost among Arab leaders Sadat is aware of the terrible costs to his own society of such a protracted struggle, and he hopes now that it will be possible to translate the psychological gain of the latest round of fighting into a political settlement that is acceptable to Egypt.

We do not think Cairo's basic pre-war objective--Israeli withdrawal to the former Egypt-Israel border--has changed as a result of the war. Sadat may now, however, be less adamant in insisting on an Israeli commitment to this as precondition to entering negotiations. It is not clear, however, whether the Soviets have the Egyptians on board in this respect. Short of such a prior Israeli commitment, Sadat can be expected to press hard for a U.S. commitment to the former border. In the end, however, Sadat may see U.S. willingness to accept the Soviets as partners and to remain engaged in the peacemaking process as a sufficient additional measure of backing for his objectives to enable him to adopt some additional degree of flexibility so far as entering negotiations is concerned.

In terms of the substantive issues in negotiations, however, we doubt that this cuts very deep. In the absence of a concrete Israeli commitment to accept the 1967 international borders as the final boundary, the Egyptians are not likely to venture far down the negotiating path on the basis of trust in the Soviets and U.S. alone. On the other hand, if Israel renounced territorial claims against Egyptian territory, this would open up possibilities for Egyptian compromises on the nature of the security arrangements and guarantees. We do not think Sadat's present position, that there must be equal demilitarized zones on both sides of the border and only UN or U.S.-Soviet peacekeeping forces at Sharm al-Shaykh, represents his final position. He is also unlikely to insist on total withdrawal by Israel in a Syrian or Jordanian settlement, or on satisfaction of extreme Palestinian demands as conditions for an Egyptian-Israeli settlement, provided face-saving formulas can be found.

(b) Negotiating Modalities

With assurances that the U.S. and Soviets will participate in the negotiations, Cairo is probably now prepared--after some haggling over preconditions--to enter direct negotiations. Sadat will probably want a UN link--perhaps a UN-chaired conference with Israel, the other Arab belligerents, and the US and USSR present. In such a forum, the Egyptians would look to the US and Soviets to do the main negotiating and, until some substantive progress is made, they would seek to avoid direct private exchanges with the Israelis except in the presence of UN or major power representatives. While such a conference is proceeding, Cairo will probably be willing to explore on a secret track under US auspices the possibilities for resolving the more difficult issues of a peace settlement.

2. Jordan

(a) Substantive Issues

Unlike Egypt and Syria, Jordan is not faced with immediate problems (loss of territory, POWs) as

a result of this latest round of fighting. Jordan's position on the substantive issues of an Israel-Jordan peace settlement probably has not changed much as a result of the war. Jordan's limited role in the fighting will give it, pari passu, a limited role in Arab councils determining strategy toward a political settlement. The King is still in a position--and presumably still willing--to agree to limited territorial adjustments in Israel's favor on the West Bank. By the same token, the pressures upon him to insist on a reasonable settlement on Jerusalem--one that at minimum gives the Arabs a religious and civic role in the life of the city--have not relaxed and may have increased somewhat as a result of the war. Even more than before the war, the King will feel that he cannot afford to get far out ahead of his Arab confreres in negotiations.

(b) Negotiating Modalities

The King would readily agree to a peace conference at which Egypt and Syria also participated. Jordan would not shrink from private exchanges with the Israelis, but these would not be likely to get far in the absence of progress on a settlement with Egypt. As a result of the war, Kuwait's subsidy to Jordan has been resumed; the King's considerable interest in preserving the subsidy is likely to make him extremely chary of appearing to make territorial concessions, or of making moves that might be seen as compromising Palestinian interests.

3. Syria

(a) Substantive Issues

Syria would have preferred to continue the fighting, but had little choice in the face of Egypt's acceptance of the ceasefire. In spite of the strain this undoubtedly caused between Cairo and Damascus, we surmise that the war, in which Egyptians and Syrians coordinated their efforts to a remarkable degree, will bequeath to the post-war situation a closer relationship between the two capitals. In spite of the seeming inconsistency, Damascus may be both aware of its

new-found military capability and at the same time willing for the first time to consider a political solution in step with Egypt.

There are likely to be continuing significant differences between Egypt and Syria, however. Syria will take a tougher stand on the Palestinian issue, and will also want to hold over the negotiations the threat to resume warfare. Syria would undoubtedly like to see the Israelis withdraw as a first step from the territory Israel has occupied in this latest round, but it is not likely to be under any pressure to take the initiative in making political concessions to achieve this.

With regard to Syria's position on the terms of a final settlement, this will probably be, along with Jerusalem, the most difficult aspect of an Arab-Israeli settlement. The Syrians will strongly oppose any territorial changes, and the Israelis will adamantly resist giving up control of the Golan Heights. The concerted efforts of the USSR, US and Egyptians will be required--perhaps as a tradeoff for pressing Israel to abandon territorial claims in Sinai--in the effort to get Syria to agree to necessary border adjustments that will leave Israel a position on the Heights. Syria will probably agree, on the other hand, to demilitarization and a UN presence in areas Israel evacuates.

(b) Negotiating Modalities

Under Soviet pressure, Damascus will probably follow Cairo's lead in agreeing to enter negotiations. It will be inclined to adhere to formal, legalistic positions, and it is not likely to take a lead in exploring the possibilities for compromise.

4. Israel

(a) Substantive Issues

Within Israel we surmise the effect of the war has been, on the one hand, to strengthen the conviction of some that continued retention of the occupied territories is necessary for Israel's security, but on the other, to lead to increased questioning among

others as to the validity of this thesis. While this debate may eventually lead to some new perceptions in Israel on the territorial issues (although this is by no means certain) the GOI's initial approach to the problem of entering negotiations is likely to be dominated by a policy that "nothing has changed." Israel will today be no more willing than in the past to agree to Arab territorial preconditions for negotiations; it may, however, be somewhat more ready to take a position that would finesse its reply to Jarring in 1971 that it was not willing to go back to the pre-1967 borders.

In negotiations, Israel will firmly maintain its position that there must be substantial changes in the pre-June 1967 boundaries on all fronts and that the only thing negotiable on Jerusalem is the status of the Islamic and Christian Holy Places. At a minimum, it will seek a part of Eastern Sinai from al-Arish to Sharm al-Shaykh, all the Golan Heights to the 1967 ceasefire line, about one-third of the West Bank including the Jordan valley, and Gaza. The extent to which these positions become negotiable will depend on how forthcoming the Arabs are with respect to formal peace commitments and recognition and, even more importantly, with respect to self-enforcing security arrangements in which Israeli military units participate on the ground. Israel will oppose substituting UN forces for its own, although it will accept reluctantly a symbolic UN umbrella.

(b) Negotiating Modalities

Israel will attempt to limit the joint US-Soviet role to one of providing auspices that will bring Israel and the Arabs together in negotiations that are unhampered by the presence or influence of third parties. The Israelis will also seek to minimize any role of the UN. They would probably in the end, however, agree to participate in a conference chaired by the UNSYG at which both the US and USSR were present, in addition to the parties directly concerned. They will not do so if the Arabs hold to their pre-war preconditions for

such negotiations. They are not likely to see the plenary sessions as a satisfactory forum for meaningful negotiations, and instead will seek parallel negotiations with the individual Arab governments. Israel would, in the appropriate circumstances and under proper conditions, be agreeable to explore on a secret track under US auspices the possibilities for resolution of the territory/security issue with Egypt, but is likely first to insist on reaching an understanding with us that would preclude our taking positions in such talks separate from Israel's, as they sought to do during the Sisco-Rabin talks in early 1972.

5. The Palestinians

A related problem is whether, and if so in what manner, we should seek to involve the Palestinians in peace negotiations. The argument in favor would be that negotiations cannot proceed very far without addressing the Palestinian problem, and this would sooner or later require some form of Palestinian representation. Realistically, however, any peace settlement must be largely at the expense of Palestinian nationhood, and we must question whether, in practical terms, separate Palestinian representation in the early stages would not hinder rather than facilitate negotiations.

A second question is who would represent the Palestinians. A recent report says that al-Fatah now favors participation in negotiations on the basis of Security Council resolution 338. The Israelis would strongly oppose, however, sitting down with any Palestinian who had practiced terrorism, and this includes most of the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the various so-called resistance organizations, who claim to be the Palestinians' chosen representatives--a claim which most Arab governments do not dispute. It is, however, strongly disputed by Jordan as well as by Israel, who both will take the position that Jordan should speak for the Palestinians in any negotiations.

Our conclusion is that it would be a mistake to try to resolve the issue of Palestinian representation in the early stages of the negotiations. We should, however, encourage Jordan to take the lead in trying to mobilize Palestinian opinion behind its approach to a settlement and to get Egyptian and Syrian support for its efforts. In coordination with Jordan, we should seek to improve our direct dialogue with responsible Palestinians in support of Jordan's own efforts.

6. Lebanon

Lebanon's position is that relations between it and Israel are governed by the 1949 Armistice Agreement-- a position Israel rejects de jure but accepts in practice. Lebanon avoided hostilities in the 1967 and 1973 wars, and is both ready for and wants an Israel-Lebanon peace settlement when settlements with other Arab states are concluded. There is no territorial dispute between Lebanon and Israel, and the task of moving at some point to a Lebanon-Israel peace settlement would appear to be comparatively easy. Lebanon will not move, however, in advance of progress toward peace settlements between Israel and its more powerful Arab neighbors. With some 250,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, the nature of the solution to the Palestinian issue will be the sensitive point for the GOL, but it would presumably be able to agree to terms that were acceptable to Egypt and Jordan. The best time to open the question of a Lebanon-Israel peace settlement and factor Lebanon into the negotiations would presumably be after substantial progress has been made on settlements between Israel and its more active Arab belligerents.

IV. Reaching Our Objective

A. General Observations

From the foregoing discussion certain observations emerge as guidelines for the strategy we adopt in trying to reach a peace settlement.

--In psychological terms the Middle East balance of power has shifted somewhat in favor of the Arabs, but not to such a degree as to alter either the fundamental substantive negotiating positions of the parties, or the basic relationships between the superpowers and the area states.

--The war has, however, loosened positions and provided some additional flexibility on procedural issues. It will be important to capitalize on this and move quickly to keep attitudes from hardening into their old molds, as they did in 1967-68.

--In spite of loosened attitudes, the parties will not go far down the negotiating road of their own accord. It may be possible to produce some initial limited agreements through U.S. good offices alone that will buy time, but we cannot expect these to expand into a willingness on the part of the Arab states and Israel to face up, by themselves, to the crunch issues involved in a final peace settlement. This will require either the U.S. alone, or the US and USSR jointly, to reach certain judgments about the terms of a settlement and press them with the parties.

--For the U.S., this will mean discussing with Israel at a fairly early date our concept of a peace settlement along the lines of the principles in Part II of this paper and stating that within that concept the U.S. will work with Israel to get the best possible deal. We would tell Israel that the precise terms of the settlement, within the conceptual framework, would be left for Israel to negotiate directly with the Arab governments. We would seek to open up a secret track of negotiations between Israel and Egypt under our auspices through which the parties would try to reach an accommodation.

--Our main task in the initial steps will therefore be to so manage the negotiations, including the Egyptian, Jordanian and Soviet postures, as to put us in the best possible position to persuade Israel to face up to the issue of territory with Egypt, in terms that will engage Egypt in secret, meaningful negotiations on the terms of a settlement.

A. Tactical Options

We have basically four options in our tactical approach to negotiations:

(a) We can work closely with the Soviets to develop joint positions for presentation to the parties. Israel would be strongly opposed to the procedure, as it was in 1969. It would, moreover, run counter to our own conviction that some areas must be left for negotiation between the parties.

(b) We can play an essentially passive role, letting the parties take the lead. This is likely to lead rapidly to an impasse on the familiar pre-war lines--Israel insisting on exploring the meaning of Arab commitments to peace; the Arabs refusing to go any distance down this road without first getting an Israeli commitment on withdrawal.

(c) We can assume the role of Israel's negotiating partner. This would, however, destroy any confidence the Arabs might have in an independent U.S. role, and thereby greatly limit our influence with the Arab governments.

(d) We can play an active unilateral role in seeking to reconcile Arab and Israeli positions, leaving the Soviets pretty much on the sidelines. If the Soviets are totally excluded, however, it will give them no incentive to use their influence to move Egypt and Syria toward a settlement, which we may need.

From the standpoint of U.S. objectives it makes little sense to think of these options as mutually exclusive. Option (b)--leaving matters to the parties--has been tried in the past with little success, and there is no reason to assume that it would

prove effective as our main course of action in the present circumstances. Option (c)--our partnership role with Israel--is inevitable to some extent as a political fact of life; our objective here should be not to allow ourselves to become so wedded to Israel's position that we lose the flexibility to resort to either options (a) or (d) when we feel this desirable.

We believe a flexible combination of these tactical options is the sensible course. Our best chance of reaching a peace agreement on terms that will serve our and Israel's interests will be to put primary reliance on option (d)--an active unilateral U.S. role to seek Arab-Israel accommodation. This will require keeping the U.S.-Soviet auspices in the background, but at the same time, keeping it alive in the form of a continuing dialogue between ourselves and the Soviets, so that the Soviets will not be tempted to play a spoiling role, and so that they will be cooperative on issues where a Soviet role will eventually be important--e.g. on arms limitation, or on guarantees.

C. Tactical Scenario

We see negotiations taking place on two separate tracks.

1. Peace Conference.

The U.S. and Soviet Union have agreed to try to bring the parties to a peace conference at an early date. We see every advantage in getting this underway as soon as possible. We want to keep up the momentum which has been provided by the ceasefire and talks between the Israeli and Egyptian military representatives. A conference that is publicly visible will maintain the confidence of both the parties and the international community that efforts to achieve a settlement are underway. It will also engage them in a process that they will find difficult to break off. Realistically, it is doubtful if the crunch issues blocking a settlement can be tackled in this type of forum. Nevertheless, at minimum, a conference would buy time and provide a public cover, while we seek to manipulate the parties into secret talks on the difficult issues.

We see an advantage in having the conference chaired by the UNSYG or a special representative appointed by him. There will be pressure for some kind of UN involvement, and this would appear the least harmful form. U.S. and Soviet representatives would presumably also be present. We would seek (a) to move negotiations from the plenary as much as possible to separate and parallel sub-negotiations, in which the parties could explore the various aspects of a settlement; (b) to give priority to an Egypt-Israel settlement as the most feasible road on which to make progress, while keeping Israel-Jordan and Israel-Syria exchanges alive; and (c) to encourage maximum direct Arab-Israel talks with a minimum of U.S.-Soviet presence.

2. Secret Track Under U.S. Auspices

While the conference is underway, we would seek to draw Egypt and Israel into secret talks under our auspices (a) initially, to explore areas of limited tradeoffs and agreements that could be translated into movement on the ground fairly rapidly, thereby increasing Israel's and Egypt's confidence in each other's intentions and making it easier for us at the appropriate time to broach with Israel our concept of a peace that meets Egypt's fundamental requirements on territory; (b) subsequently, to explore the possibilities for resolving the issues of a final peace settlement. A logical point of departure for Egyptian-Israeli secret talks under our auspices would be to explore ways of reconciling the Israeli and Egyptian "disengagement" proposals they have given us.

We would also have to decide how to handle the Soviets with respect to the second track. To try to keep them in the dark is probably not realistic and risks their attempting to sabotage our efforts. To include them as a partner would be unwelcome to the Israelis and probably to the Egyptians as well. In the circumstances, the Soviet factor can probably best be managed by (a) taking them into our confidence in general terms about what we are doing through periodic briefings in private channels, (b) working closely and visibly with them in the formal negotiations, and

(c) assuring that any results achieved on the secret track emerge publicly as the outcome of the joint U.S.-Soviet auspices talks.

V. ARMS SUPPLY RESTRAINT

We would seek to utilize the flexibility of the post-hostilities atmosphere to establish momentum towards Great Power restraint in supplying arms to the Middle East. Our approach would be two-pronged:

--persuading the Soviets to agree to sharply reduce current levels of resupply while peace negotiations are in progress. While there are many uncertainties involved in implementing an interim cut-back, both we and the Soviets will soon have filled our clients' most urgent requirements and present Israeli military superiority provides them and us a margin of safety. A hiatus in supply would benefit the atmosphere for peace negotiations and direct attention away from a major irritant in our dealings with the Arabs.

--negotiating a long-term agreement restraining arms supply with the Soviets and other suppliers. Although this is an extremely complex matter, we see it as an indispensable element in a peace settlement package, and an important element to pressure the Arabs and Israelis to negotiate seriously. Our negotiations with the Soviets should, therefore, run parallel with the peace talks, and we will have to develop a negotiating position quickly.

The two elements are mutually supporting and should be presented simultaneously to the Soviets. We recognize that a short-term agreement may not be attainable; in that case the long-term proposal should still be pursued. The Israelis will resist our exploring both proposals, but we might be able to overcome their objections so long as any actual reductions in the quantity and rate of arms supply to Israel are carried out on the basis of strict and demonstrable reciprocity with regard to arms shipments to the Arabs. We would, however, want to weigh the relative priorities of pressing Israel to agree to arms limitations and pressing it for concessions in the negotiations with

the Arabs. It may well be that pressing on both fronts will be more than the traffic will bear and that we will want to defer the former in the interests of seeking Israeli cooperation in the negotiations.

As part of the short-term package we would consider providing symbolically important equipment to Jordan and Lebanon. Longer-term supply relationships with these countries and with our friends in the Arabian Peninsula would be determined as part of the overall long-term agreement.

Background discussion and a proposed scenario are provided at TAB F.

VI. Orchestrating International and Domestic Support

If we are to assure maximum international and domestic support for our efforts to bring about a successful outcome of the Arab-Israeli negotiations, we will need to devote continuing and systematic attention to the following:

--Briefing our friends and allies.

--Briefing other Arab governments, particularly those (such as Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco) whose understanding and support would be helpful vis-a-vis the Arab parties to the negotiations. Criticism of our efforts or of the Arab governments in the negotiations would create serious obstacles to the kind of accommodations the parties are going to have to make if there is to be progress.

--Briefing key members of Congress on a continuing basis to elicit their understanding and support. This will be particularly important as we will be seeking concessions which Israel will be reluctant to make and can expect Israel to seek to mobilize its supporters in Congress to bring pressure to bear on the administration.

--Adopting a public posture that will help insure understanding of our objectives in American public opinion. In this connection we will want to consider a major speech at the appropriate time by the Secretary to set forth our approach and objectives.